Privacy Preserving Estimation of Social Influence

Tamir Tassa
The Open University
Ra’anana, Israel
tamirta@openu.ac.il

ABSTRACT

Exploiting word-of-mouth effect to create viral cascades in social networks is a very appealing possibility from the marketing standpoint. However, in order to set up an effective viral marketing campaign, one has first to accurately estimate social influence. This is usually done by analyzing user activity data. As we point out in this paper, the data analysis and sharing that is needed to estimate social influence raises important privacy issues that may jeopardize the legal, ethical and societal acceptability of such practice, and in turn, the concrete applicability of viral marketing in the real world.

In this paper we devise secure multiparty protocols that allow a group of service providers and a social networking platform to jointly compute social influence, in a privacy preserving manner.

1. INTRODUCTION

The idea of viral marketing is that of exploiting a pre-existing social network in order to increase brand awareness or to achieve other marketing objectives (such as product sales) through self-replicating viral processes, analogous to the spread of viruses. More concretely, the idea is to "target" the most influential users in the network so that, hopefully, they will create a word-of-mouth driven cascade, potentially delivering the marketing message to a large portion of the network, with a small initial marketing cost.

The key computational problem behind viral marketing is that known as influence maximization, formalized by Kempe et al. [1] as a constrained optimization problem: given a directed social graph, where each arc is labeled with a probability representing the strength of social influence along the arc, and given a budget $k$, find $k$ "seed" nodes such that activating them maximizes the expected number of nodes that eventually get activated. This problem has received a great deal of attention by the data mining research community in the last decade. Regardless of this effort, the field is still far from maturity: influence maximization is still an ideal problem, mainly studied from the algorithmic standpoint, under strong assumptions and with a large gap from real-world applicability.

A first observation is that the majority of research in the field assumes that the input social graph comes already with the influence strength associated to each link. However, this is not the case in real-world social networks. Following this observation, various researchers [2, 3, 4] have turned their attention to the problem of learning social influence strength.

Given (1) the social graph and (2) a log of past propagation traces (for instance, the history of sales of some products to the users in the social network) and assuming a propagation model which governs the manner in which influence-driven propagations occur, the problem is to learn the parameters of the model, i.e., the influence probability associated to each arc.

In real life, however, social networking platforms are owned by a third party such as Facebook or Twitter (we refer to the network owner as the host). The proprietary social graph is an important asset with inestimable value, thus the host keeps it secret for obvious reasons of commercial benefits, as well as due to privacy legislation1. For the very same reasons, the service provider that is interested in setting up the viral marketing campaign (e.g., an e-book store), must keep his historic sales data secret. Therefore, we face a scenario in which two distinct parties (the host $H$ and the service provider $P$) hold, one each, the two pieces that constitute the input to the problem of learning the influence strength: $H$ has the social graph, while $P$ holds the log of past propagation traces.

Viral marketing is offered by $H$ as a service to $P$ [5, 6]; this might be in the form of advertising space, paid by $P$ to $H$ on a pay-per-impression basis. $H$ attempts to optimize the placement of advertisements in order to maximize influence diffusion. This optimization is provided as a service to $P$, with the primary goal of making the social network more attractive as a marketing platform.

However, in order to solve the influence maximization problem and to set up the viral marketing campaign, it is first needed to learn the influence strength. It is in the interest of both $H$ and $P$ to learn peer influence accurately so that the viral marketing campaign is more likely to be successful.

So how can $H$ and $P$ learn the influence strength while keeping their data secret? This is the problem that we study in this paper.

Beyond the mere privacy issues, the problem that we study is also motivated by the accuracy of the influence learning task. It has been already observed [7, 8] that the propagation models have a very large number of parameters (the influence strength of each of the social links), which makes the learning task prone to overfitting. In order to reduce the risk of overfitting, larger logs of past propagations (i.e., more data) are preferable. Therefore, it would make perfect sense if various service providers, $P_1, \ldots, P_n$, which are interested in doing viral marketing with $H$, would put their data together (in a secure way) in order to arrive to more accurate estimates of the social influences.

When we consider the case of multiple service providers conjoining their propagations, a distinction between two cases is in order. In the first case, each service provider sells different items: this means that the propagation of an item is completely contained in one provider’s data. We refer to this setting as the exclusive case. In the second, the so-called non-exclusive case, the same item may be offered by different providers. This means that the trace of a propagation of an item might be partitioned between datasets of different parties. Consider, for instance, a case where user $v$ was influenced by her friend $u$ in $H$’s social network to buy a specific book. However, while $u$ bought the book from the book store $P_1$, $v$ got hers from a different store $P_2$. If the two stores would not share their sales data, none of them would have any evidence of $u$ influencing $v$ on buying that book. In order to obtain a complete propagation trace, it is necessary for such service providers to conjoin their data. This means that having more parties participating in the secure computation of social influence results not only in a larger corpus of data, but also in “better”, more complete data. Since those parties cannot disclose the activity logs of their customers to each other, such conjoining of data must be carried out in a private manner.

The two main contributions of this paper are:

- Secure multiparty protocols that allow a group of service providers and a social network host to jointly compute the link influence strengths, in either the exclusive or the non-exclusive case (Section 5).
- Secure multiparty protocols to compute directly a user influence score, for each user in the social network, in either the exclusive or the non-exclusive case (Section 6).

These, in turn, build upon the following more fundamental contributions:

- Two general-purpose secure arithmetic protocols: one for computing integer additive shares of a sum of private inputs, and another for computing the quotient of two private integers (Section 4).

We analyze the privacy of each of the proposed protocols under the standard assumption that the participating players are semi-honest, i.e., they respect the protocol, but try to learn as much as they can from their own view of the protocol on the private information held by other players.3

Analyzing and sharing user activity on modern social media and e-commerce platforms raises important privacy issues. Understanding such issues and devising adequate technological solutions is crucial, both from the legal point of view and that of social acceptance of techniques such as viral marketing. Without this, the real-world applicability of such practice is in jeopardy. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to tackle these important privacy issues and to propose concrete solutions.

之战

2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

Learning link influence strength. As stated in the introduction, a basic computational problem in the area of viral marketing is that of selecting the set of users to be targeted by the campaign [11, 12], which was formalized by Kempe et al. [1] as a discrete optimization problem, named influence maximization: given a social network where each link is associated with an estimate of influence strength, and a budget $k$, find $k$ nodes that provide the maximum expected spread, i.e., the expected number of active nodes at the end of the process. Part of the contribution of Kempe et al. [1] was to provide a simple (but computationally prohibitive) greedy algorithm with approximation guarantees. Following that seminal work, considerable effort was devoted to developing methods for improving the efficiency of influence maximization. Most of those studies assume a weighted social graph as input and do not consider the problem of computing the link influence strength, e.g. [13, 14].

Saito et al. [2] were the first to study how to learn the link influence probabilities from a set of past propagations. They neatly formalized the likelihood maximization problem and then applied Expectation Maximization (EM) to solve it. Although elegant, their formulation has some limitations when it comes to practice. First, real data needs to be heavily discretized to meet the assumed input format [15]. Second, the EM-based method is particularly prone to overfitting [7]. Finally, it is not very scalable as it needs to update the influence probability associated to each arc in each iteration.

For these reasons and for the sake of simplicity, we avoid the complexity of the EM-based approach when learning the influence probabilities for the influence maximization problem, and instead we follow a simpler definition by Goyal et al. [4], which also considered temporal decay of influence. We provide the details of this definition in Section 3.1.

Learning user influence score. The whole learning framework underlying the influence maximization problem (i.e., first learn an influence probability for each link, then apply an algorithm to discover influential users) might be considered cumbersome and inefficient. An alternative might be to just mine the social graph together with the log of available propagations in order to assign a score of influence to each user. Goyal et al. [16, 17] defined a notion of leadership based on how frequently a user exhibited an influential behavior. In particular, the size of the propagation sub-graph “below” a certain user $u$ was used as a measure of $u$’s influence. The same measure was used by Bakshy et al. [18] in the context of Twitter. We consider also this measure of influence (formally defined in Section 3.2).

Privacy preserving data mining has mainly been studied under two distinct settings. In the first setting, the data owner and the data miner are two different entities, and the goal is to protect the data records from the data miner. The main approach in this context is to apply data perturbation [19, 20]. The idea is that the perturbed data can be used to infer general trends in the data, while revealing (almost) no information on the original records.

In the second setting (which is the one considered in this paper), the data is distributed among several parties who aim to jointly perform data mining on the unified corpus of data that they hold, while protecting the data records of each of the data owners from the other data owners. This is a problem of secure multi-party computation (SMC). In the
general setting of SMC, there are several parties (or players), $P_1, \ldots, P_n$, where each party $P_i$ holds a private value $x_i$. The goal is to compute the value $f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$, where $f$ is some publicly known function of $n$ variables, so that each party does not learn anything about the private inputs of the other parties, except the information that is implied by his own input and the output result $f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$. The problem of secure two-party computation was solved by Yao [21] for any function $f$ that can be represented by a binary or an algebraic circuit. While generic protocols, such as Yao’s and its extensions to any number of parties, apply in theory to a wide class of functions, their applicability in practice is limited to functions that have a compact representation as a circuit, due to their high computational and communication complexities. The aim of further studies in this field is to find more efficient solutions for specific problems of SMC: e.g., decision trees [22], clustering [23], and association rule mining [24, 25, 26]. It should be noted that some relaxations of the notion of perfect privacy are usually inevitable when looking for practical solutions, provided that the excess information is deemed benign (see examples of such protocols in e.g. [9, 24, 25, 27]). For each of the protocols that we present in this paper, we bound the excess information that it may leak to the interacting players and explain why such leakage of information is benign, or how it may be reduced.

3. PROBLEM DEFINITION

In this section we define the data model, the computation of influence strength for each social link (following [4]) and the node influence score (inspired by [16, 18]).

We consider a social network, which is a graph $G = (V, E)$ where the nodes are users and the links denote some relation between the users. When the relation is symmetric (such as the “friendship” relation in Facebook) the graph is undirected; when the relation is asymmetric (such as the “following” relation in Twitter) the graph is directed. We shall assume hereinafter that the graph is directed and a link $(u, v) \in E$ indicates the fact that $v$ is a follower of $u$, i.e., $v$ is notified about $u$’s activities, or in other terms, $u$ can influence $v$.

We are also given a relation $L$ (User; Time; Action) which we call action log. Each record in that log is a tuple of the form $(v, \alpha, t)$ which indicates the fact that user $v$ performed action $\alpha$ at time $t$. We assume that: (a) the projection of $L$ on the first column is contained in the set $V$ of nodes of the social graph $G = (V, E)$;5 (b) the set of all possible actions is denoted $\mathcal{A}$; and (c) time is represented by positive integers. Moreover, we assume that any given user performs any given action at most once. (Hence, if a user bought, for example, the same book twice, we consider only the first purchase.)

There are $m$ service providers, $P_1, \ldots, P_m$, and each $P_k, 1 \leq k \leq m$, owns an action log $L_k$ that consists of the actions performed at the site of that service provider. The unified log is $L = \bigcup_{k=1}^{m} L_k$. These $m$ service providers, together with the host, wish to compute the link influence strength (as defined in Section 3.1) and the user influence score (as defined in Section 3.2) in a secure manner.

4Undirected graphs will be thought of as directed graph where each undirected edge $(u, v)$ is replaced by the two directed arcs $(u, v)$ and $(v, u)$.

5In practice, the service providers may have users that are not members of the social network. Such users may be ignored since questions of influence are relevant only in a social framework.

3.1 Link influence strength

Assume that $V = \{v_1, \ldots, v_n\}$. Here we define the influence probabilities $p_{i,j}$ for all $((i, j), (v_i, v_j)) \in E$. The value $p_{i,j}$ is an estimate to the probability that user $v_j$ will perform some action if $v_i$ performs that action. The estimate is based on the past activity of those users as reported in the action logs. To define $p_{i,j}$, we introduce the following notations:

- $a_i$ is the number of tuples in $L$ in which the first component is $v_i$. It equals the number of actions that $v_i$ did.
- $b_{i,j}^\ell$ is the number of actions $\alpha$ such that $L$ includes a record $(v_i, \alpha, t)$ as well as a record $(v_j, \alpha, t')$, where $t \leq t' \leq t + \ell$, for some integer $h \geq 1$. It represents the number of times in which $v_i$ followed $v_j$ in doing some action, assuming a memory window of width $h$.
- $c_{i,j}^\ell$ is the number of actions $\alpha$ such that $L$ includes a record $(v_i, \alpha, t)$ as well as a record $(v_j, \alpha, t + h)$. It is the number of times in which $v_i$ followed $v_j$ in doing some action exactly $h$ time steps after $v_i$ performed that action.

One way of defining $p_{i,j}$ is by picking some value of $h$ and then set

$$p_{i,j} = \frac{b_{i,j}^h}{a_i}.$$  

(1)

Namely, it is the fraction of times in which $v_i$ succeeded in influencing $v_j$ (to follow him within $h$ time steps). A more generalized definition would be

$$p_{i,j} = \frac{\sum_{\ell=1}^{h} w_{\ell} c_{i,j}^\ell}{a_i},$$  

(2)

where $0 < w_{\ell}$ and $\sum_{\ell=1}^{h} w_{\ell} = h$. The definition in equation (1) is a special case of the definition in equation (2) when $w_{\ell} = 1$ for all $1 \leq \ell \leq h$. By taking $w_{1}, \ldots, w_{h}$ one may achieve a temporal decay effect; namely, the faster $v_j$ follows $v_i$ in doing an action, the more we consider $v_i$’s action to be a result of $v_j$’s influence on him. In either of these definitions, $p_{i,j}$ is set arbitrarily to zero if the denominator $a_i$ is zero (since if $v_i$ performed no action, we have no way of determining his influence on others).

3.2 User influence score

Above we defined a way to compute the influence probability for each link, which is a needed input for the influence maximization problem [1]. When focusing on links, one only needs to count the episodes of influence, i.e., the number of actions that “travelled” along the link. Then the influence maximization framework will take care of combining this information to find influential users.

We next define an alternative to the influence maximization framework: a score of influence for each node, obtained directly by mining the social graph together with the log of past propagation traces. In this case, we cannot just consider how a node $u$ influences its immediate neighbors; we must take into account how $u$’s influence transitively affects the neighbors of $u$’s neighbors, thus propagating in the network. This is captured in the next definitions.

DEFINITION 3.1. Given an action $\alpha \in \mathcal{A}$, its propagation graph $PG(\alpha) = (V(E(\alpha)))$ is a labeled graph where there is an arc $(v_i, v_j) \in E(\alpha)$ with label $\Delta t$, if $(v_i, v_j) \in E$ and $(v_i, \alpha, t_i), (v_j, \alpha, t_j) \in L$ with $\Delta t := t_j - t_i > 0$. 

561
Definition 3.2 (User influence sphere). Given an action $\alpha \in A$ and a maximum propagation time threshold $\tau$, the $\tau$-influence sphere of a user $v_i \in V$, denoted $\text{Inf}_{\tau}(v_i, \alpha)$, is the set of nodes reachable from $v_i$ in $PG(\alpha)$ by a path whose sum of labels is at most $\tau$.

Finally, we are ready to define the user influence scores.

Definition 3.3 (User influence score). Given a social graph $G = (V,E)$, an action log $L$, and a time threshold $\tau$, the $\tau$-influence score of a node $v_i \in V$ is the average size of all its $\tau$-influence spheres,
\[
\text{score}(v_i) = \frac{\sum_{\alpha \in A} |\text{Inf}_{\tau}(v_i, \alpha)|}{a_i},
\]where $a_i$ is the number of actions performed by $v_i$. (If $a_i = 0$, then $\text{score}(v_i)$ is set to zero.)

In Sec. 5 we describe secure distributed protocols for computing the link influence strength as defined in Sec. 3.1, while in Sec. 6, we describe secure distributed protocols for computing user influence scores as defined above.

4. SECURE ARITHMETIC PROTOCOLS

In this section we present two general-purpose secure arithmetic protocols that will be used in the subsequent sections: a secure protocol for computing integer additive shares of a sum of private inputs (Section 4.1) and a secure protocol for computing the quotient of two private integers (Section 4.2).

4.1 Secure computation of integer additive shares of a sum of private integers

Let $P_1, \ldots, P_m$ be $m$ players, each holding a private integer $x_k \in [0, A]$, such that $x := \sum_{k=1}^{m} x_k \leq A$. Protocol 2 enables them to compute integer additive shares of $x$; specifically, at the end of the protocol, player $P_1$ holds a random integer $s_1 \in [0, S - 1]$, where $S$ is some large integer that is set upfront, and $P_2$ holds the integer $s_2 = x - s_1$.

First, we consider a simpler problem where, for the same setting as described above, $P_1$ and $P_2$ wish to compute two modular additive shares of $x$. Protocol 1, due to Be-naloh [28], is a well-known perfectly secure protocol that solves that problem.

Protocol 1 - Secure computation of modular additive shares of a sum of private inputs.

**Input**: $A, S \in \mathbb{Z}^+$ such that $S \gg A$.

An integer $x_k \in [0, A]$ for each player $P_k$, $1 \leq k \leq m$, such that $x := \sum_{k=1}^{m} x_k \leq A$.

**Output**: $P_1$ gets a random $s_1 \in [0, S - 1]$;

$P_2$ gets $s_2 \in [0, S - 1] - S$ such that $s_1 + s_2 = x \mod S$.

1: Each player $P_k$, $1 \leq k \leq m$, selects $m$ random values $x_{k,j} \in \mathbb{Z}_S$, $1 \leq j \leq m$, such that $\sum_{j=1}^{m} x_{k,j} = x_k \mod S$.
2: $P_k$ sends $x_{k,j}$ to $P_k$, for all $1 \leq k \neq j \leq m$.
3: $P_1$ computes $s_1 = \sum_{k=1}^{m} x_{k,j} \mod S$, for all $1 \leq j \leq m$.
4: Players $P_3, \ldots, P_m$ send $s_1, \ldots, s_m$ to $P_2$.
5: $P_2$ updates $s_2 \leftarrow s_2 + s_3 + \cdots + s_m \mod S$.

It is easy to see that the two shares $s_1$ and $s_2$ satisfy $s_1 + s_2 = x \mod S$. Moreover, since each player $P_k$ breaks his input $x_k$ into a sum of $m$ random shares, the value of $s_1$ (as well as that of $s_2$) can be any of the elements in $[0, S - 1]$ with equal probabilities. Since player $P_k$ is exposed only to one additive share in the input $x_k$, he learns nothing on that input, $1 \leq k \neq \ell \leq m$. Finally, since every player $P_k$, $k \neq 2$, receives just one additive share in $x$, while $P_2$ receives only $m - 1$ of the additive shares of $x$ ($s_2, s_3, \ldots, s_m$), no player learns any information on $x$ (beyond what is implied by his own input).

Now, we wish to turn Protocol 1 into a protocol that computes integer additive shares of $x$. Protocol 1 computes modular shares $s_1$ and $s_2$ such that $s_1 + s_2 = x \mod S$. Hence, if we view those shares as integers from $[0, S - 1]$, then either $s_1 + s_2 = x$ or $s_1 + s_2 = S + x$. Therefore, all we need to do is to decide whether $s_1 + s_2 < S$.

If inequality (4) holds, then $s_1$ and $s_2$ are already integer additive shares of $x$; otherwise, $s_1$ and $s_2 - S$ are integer additive shares of $x$. Hence, Protocol 1 could be extended by verifying inequality (4) and, consequently, replacing $s_2$ with $s_2 - S$ if needed. To that end, $P_1$ and $P_2$ may engage in a secure multiparty protocol for verifying (4). This is an instance of the millionaires’ problem, that was introduced by Yao [21]. Alas, all known protocols that solve this basic problem invoke costly sub-protocols for oblivious transfer [29]. In Protocol 2 we suggest a much simpler solution which depends on the existence of a curious-but-honest third party. That third party could be $P_3$ (if $m > 2$) or $H$ (the host).

Protocol 2 - Secure computation of integer additive shares of a sum of private inputs.

**Input**: $A, S \in \mathbb{Z}^+$ such that $S \gg A$.

An integer $x_k \in [0, A]$ for each player $P_k$, $1 \leq k \leq m$, such that $x := \sum_{k=1}^{m} x_k \leq A$.

**Output**: $P_1$ gets a random $s_1 \in [0, S - 1]$;

$P_2$ gets $s_2 = x - s_1$.

1: The players perform Protocol 1, after which $P_1$ holds $s_1$, $i = 1, 2$, such that $s_1 + s_2 = x \mod S$.
2: $P_2$ generates uniformly at random an integer $r \in [0, S - A - 1]$.
3: $P_1$ sends $s_1$ to $P_3$
4: $P_2$ sends $s_2 + r$ to $P_3$.
5: $P_3$ computes $y = s_1 + s_2 + r$.
6: $P_3$ informs $P_2$ whether $y \geq S$ or not.
7: if $y \geq S$ then
8: $P_2$ updates $s_2 \leftarrow s_2 - S$.
9: end if

Protocol 2 is based on the idea that in order to determine which equality holds, $s_1 + s_2 = x$ or $s_1 + s_2 = S + x$, it suffices to add to $s_1 + s_2$ an integer $r \in [0, S - A - 1]$ and then check whether the resulting sum (in Step 5) is greater than or equal to $S$. If $s_1 + s_2 = x$ (in which case $s_1$ and $s_2$ are already integer additive shares as needed) then $s_1 + s_2 \leq A$; in that case $y = s_1 + s_2 + r \leq A + (S - A - 1) = S - 1$, and, consequently, $P_2$ leaves $s_2$ as is. If, however, $s_1 + s_2 = S + x$, then $y \geq S$; in that case, $P_3$ replaces $s_2$ with $S - s_2$, so that $s_1$ and $s_2$ become integer additive shares of $x$ (Steps 7-8).

Protocol 2 is “almost” perfectly secure in the following sense.

**Theorem 4.1.** At the end of Protocol 2 none of the players learns anything about the inputs of the other players. As for the sum $x$:...
(a) Player $P_2$ may learn either a lower bound on $x$, in probability $x/S$, or an upper bound, in probability $(A-x)/S$, or nothing at all, in probability $(S-A)/S$.

(b) Player $P_2$ may learn either a lower bound on $x$, in probability at most $A/(S-A)$, or an upper bound, in probability at most $(S-3A)/(S-A)$, or nothing at all, in probability at least $(S-3A)/(S-A)$.

(c) All other players learn nothing about $x$.

PROOF. The proof follows the real vs. ideal paradigm. In this paradigm, we consider the real-world model, in which the protocol is executed, versus an ideal model, involving a trusted third party who executes the computational task. If the view of any real-world adversary can be simulated by an ideal-world adversary, the protocol is perfectly secure.

Consider first any player $P_i$ where $i \neq 2,3$. The view of such a player in Protocol 2 is exactly like his view in Protocol 1. As the view of each of the players in Protocol 1 consists of shares that distribute uniformly at random over $Z_S$, it can be simulated by an ideal-world simulator. Hence, it suffices to focus on $P_2$ and $P_3$ who are the only players whose view in Protocol 2 differs from that in Protocol 1. $P_2$’s view in Protocol 2 contains (in addition to his view in Protocol 1) the value of $y = s_1 + s_2 + r$ (Step 6). $P_2$’s view in Protocol 2 contains the answer to whether $y \geq S$ or not (Step 6). Since those two pieces of information cannot be simulated, we need to analyze what can be inferred from them.

We start with $P_3$, who learns the value of $y$. If $y < S$ he infers that $y = x + r$; otherwise he infers that $y = S = x + r$. In any case, he learns the value $x + r = z$. Since $x = z - r$ and $0 \leq r \leq S - A - 1$, it follows that

$$z - (S - A - 1) \leq x \leq z.$$  

(5)

Since it is known upfront that $0 \leq x \leq A$, the upper bound in (5) reveals new information on $x$ only when $z < A$. For every $i \in \{0,1,\ldots,A-1\}$, $Pr(z = i) = \sum_{t=0}^{A-1} Pr(x = j) \cdot Pr(r = i-j)$. Since $r$ distributes uniformly over $Z_S$, it follows that $Pr(z = i) = \frac{1}{S} \sum_{j=0}^{A-1} Pr(x = j) \leq \frac{1}{A}$.

Hence, $Pr(z < A) = \sum_{i=0}^{A-2} Pr(z = i) \leq \frac{A-1}{A}$. Therefore, $P_3$ may learn a non-trivial upper bound on $x$ in probability no greater than $A/(S - A)$. Similarly, we can show that he may learn a non-trivial lower bound in probability no greater than $A/(S - A)$. The last two probability inequalities imply that in probability at least $(S-3A)/(S-A)$, the value of $z$ does not allow $P_3$ to exclude any possible value of $x$ in the range $[0,A]$. In addition, the value of $z$ does not induce an a-posteriori belief probability distribution on $x$ that differs from the belief probability distribution that $P_3$ had prior to seeing $z$, owing to the uniform random manner in which the masking value $r$ is chosen.

We now turn to $P_2$. If he learns that $s_1 + s_2 < S$, then $P_2$ also learns that $x = s_1 + s_2$ in $Z_Z$, whence $0 \leq x_1, x_2 \leq x$. Since $s_2$ is a sum of random $Z_S$-shares of $x_1, 1 \leq k \leq m$, it is uniformly distributed over $Z_S$. Since the case $s_1 + s_2 < S$ occurs only if $s_2 \in \{0,1,\ldots,x\}$, its probability is $(x+1)/S$. In that case, $P_2$ may infer that $x \geq s_2$. That lower bound is non-trivial only when $s_2 > 0$. Hence, $P_2$ learns a (non-trivial) lower bound on $x$ in probability $(S-A)/S$. If $P_2$ learns that $s_1 + s_2 \geq S$, it can happen only if both $s_1$ and $s_2$ are strictly greater than $x$ (since if, say, $s_1 \leq x$, then $s_2 = x - s_1 \leq x$). Hence, in that case $x \leq s_2 - 1$. Only when $s_2 \leq A$, the upper bound is non-trivial. Therefore, $P_2$ learns a (non-trivial) upper bound on $x$ in probability $(A-x)/S$. When $s_2 > A$, $P_2$ can learn nothing on $x$.

Hence, $P_2$ learns nothing on $x$ when $s_2 = 0$ or when $s_2 > A$. Since $s_2$ distributes uniformly in $Z_S$, $P_2$ learns no information at all in probability $(S-A)/S$. □

To summarize, the only potential leakages of information are to only two players. Those potential leakages of information are only with respect to $x$ (but not with respect to the private inputs of other players), and only in the form of a lower or an upper bound. Moreover, the probability of those potential leakages to occur can be made negligible since $A$ is a given integer and $S$ can be chosen arbitrarily large.

Later on, in Section 5, we need to compute additive shares in a large number of counter values ($a_i$ and $b_i^k$ that were introduced earlier in Section 3.1). Instead of invoking Protocol 2 separately for each of those computations, we perform them in parallel. That enables us to reduce the communication costs, as well as to improve the privacy of the protocol. Specifically, the parallel execution of computing the additive shares for all of those counters essentially removes the potential leakage of information to $P_3$ that was described in Theorem 4.1. (See more details in Section 5.)

### 4.2 Secure division of private integers

The secure computation problem that we address here involves three players: $P_1$, $P_2$, and $H$. Each of the first two players holds an integer $a_i$ that is taken from a range $[0,A]$. They wish to let $H$ compute the real quotient $q := a_1/a_2$ (where $q$ is interpreted as zero if $a_2 = 0$), without disclosing the values of $a_1$ and $a_2$ to $H$, beyond what is implied by $q$. (Note that we are interested here in computing $a_1/a_2$ as the real quotient of two integers. This problem differs from the problem of computing $a_1 \cdot a_2^{-1}$ where $a_1$ and $a_2$ are viewed as elements in a finite field; the latter problem may be solved, e.g., by means of homomorphic encryption.)

**Protocol 3 - Secure computation of the quotient of private integers.**

**Input:** $P_i$ has an integer $a_i \in [0,A]$, $i = 1,2$.

**Output:** $H$ computes $q = ra_1/ra_2$.

1. $P_1$ and $P_2$ jointly generate a random real number $M \sim Z$, where $Z$ is the distribution on $[1, \infty)$ with pdf (probability density function) $f_M(\mu) = \mu^{-2}$.
2. $P_1$ and $P_2$ jointly generate a random real $R \sim U(0,M)$.
3. $P_1$ sends $ra_1$ to $H$.
4. $P_2$ sends $ra_2$ to $H$.
5. If $ra_2 \neq 0$ then
6. $H$ computes $q = ra_1/ra_2$.
7. else
8. $H$ computes $q = 0$.
9. end if

Protocol 3 solves that problem. In order to discuss its privacy, we first prove the next theorem.

**Theorem 4.2.** Let $X$ be a random variable that takes values in $[0,A]$, and let $f_X(x)$ denote its pdf. Let $R$ be a uniform random variable on $(0,\mu)$, for some real number $\mu > 0$, and let $Y = XR$. Then for all $x > 0$ and $y > 0$, $f_X(x|y) = G_\mu(x,y)$ where

$$G_\mu(x,y) := \begin{cases} 0 & y > \mu x \\ \int_0^{x/y} f_X(t) \alpha(y,\mu) dt & y \leq \mu x \end{cases},$$

and $\alpha(y,\mu) := \frac{\mu}{\mu y}$.
Proof. The definition of $Y$ as the product of $X$ and $R$, where $R$ is a uniform random variable on $(0, \mu)$, implies that $f_Y(y|X = x) = 0$ if $y > \mu x$, while $f_Y(y|X = x) = \frac{1}{\mu}$ otherwise ($f_Y$ being the pdf of $Y$). Therefore, $f_Y(y) = \int_0^\mu f_Y(y|X = t) f_X(t) dt = \int_0^\mu f_X(t) \frac{f_Y(y)}{\mu} dt$. Our claim now follows from Bayes Theorem, by which $f_X(x|Y = y) = f_Y(y|X = x) \cdot \frac{f_X(x)}{f_Y(y)}$. □

Let us fix $1 \leq i \leq 2$ and let $X$ denote the random variable that governs the value of $a_i$. Assume that $H$ has an a-priori belief probability $f_X(x)$ regarding the value of $X$. In Protocol 3, $H$ learns the value $y := rx$, where $x = a_i$. That value of $y$ enables $H$ to extract an a-posteriori belief probability regarding the value of $x = a_i$, as follows. If $H$ had known the value of $y$ that was chosen as an upper bound for $r$, then given $y = rx$, he could be able to infer, by Theorem 4.2, that $f_X(x|Y = y) = G_{a_i}(x,y)$. In particular, since $G_{a_i}(x,y)$ is nonzero only when $x \geq y/M$, he would be able to infer that $y \geq x/M$. That is a non-trivial upper bound since the expected value of $y$ is $Mx/2$, and therefore the expected value of the lower bound that $H$ can derive is $x/2$. However, $P_1$ and $P_2$ choose $M$ randomly from the distribution $Z$ on $[1,\infty)$. That selection of $M$ leaves every $x > 0$ as a possible pre-image, given the value of $y = rx > 0$, as we show next.

Hereinafter, we concentrate on the case that interests us, where $X$ is a discrete random variable that takes values in the set of integers $\{0,1,\ldots, A\}$. In that case, $f_X(x)$ is a discrete distribution of the form $f_X(x) = \sum_{k=0}^A f_X(x-k)$, where $\delta(\cdot)$ is the Dirac delta function. For such discrete distributions, any value of $y > 0$ leaves all values of $x$ as possible pre-images, unless $x$ is a-priori known to be an impossible value:

**Theorem 4.3.** Given $y > 0$, $f_X(x|Y = y) > 0$ if $f_X(x) > 0$, and $f_X(x|Y = y) = 0$ if $f_X(x) = 0$.

Proof. We distinguish between two cases: $y \leq A$ and $y > A$. In the first case, every value of $\mu \geq 1$ is possible; in the second case, the value of $\mu$ reveals that $\mu$ must have been at least $y/A$. Therefore, the a-posteriori distribution of $\mu$, given the value of $y$, remains $Z$ in the first case, with the pdf $f_Z(\mu) = \mu^{-2}$, but in the second case it is the distribution on $[y/A, \infty)$ with the rescaled pdf $\frac{y}{\mu} \cdot f_Z(\mu)$. Hereinafter, $\Phi(\mu)$ is the a-posteriori pdf of $\mu$.

By the complete probability theorem,

$$f_X(x|Y = y) = \int_1^\infty f_X(x|Y = y , M_i = \mu) \Phi(\mu) d\mu = \int_1^\infty G_{\mu}(x,y) \cdot \Phi(\mu) d\mu.$$

Using Equation (6), we infer that

$$f_X(x|Y = y) = \frac{f_X(x)}{x} \cdot \int_{\max(1,y/x)}^\infty \frac{\Phi(\mu) d\mu}{\alpha(y, \mu)} \quad (7)$$

We need to show that this probability is well defined and positive for all $x \in \{1, \ldots, A\}$ with $f_X(x) > 0$. Since $f_X(x) = \sum_{k=0}^A f_X(x-k)$, we have

$$\alpha(y, \mu) = \sum_{k=0}^A \frac{f_X(k)}{k}. \quad (8)$$

As $y/\mu \leq y/(\mu x) = x \leq A$, the above sum contains at least the term $f_X(A)/A$. Without loss of generality, we may assume that $f_X(A) > 0$ (since $A$ may be taken as the maximal integer for which $f_X(A) > 0$). Hence, $\alpha(y, \mu) > 0$ for all $\mu > y/x$. Therefore, the integrand in Equation (7) is well defined and positive over the domain of integration. (The integral is improper, but it is finite since the denominator is bounded from below by $f_X(\mu)/A$ and $\int_{\max(1,y/x)}^\infty \Phi(\mu) d\mu < \infty$.) That completes the proof. □

Perfect privacy would be achieved if $f_X(x|Y = y) = f_X(x)$, namely, if the a-posteriori belief probability regarding the value of $x$ would be the same as the a-priori one. Our mechanism does not provide that. The value $y = 0$ reveals that $x = 0$, while any value $y > 0$ induces an a-posteriori belief mechanism that differs from $f_X(x)$. Abeit not perfect, this is a significant level of privacy.

In our context, $x = a_2$ is the number of times that a particular user did some action, while $x = a_1$ is the number of times in which one user followed his friend in doing some action. In that case, the value $x = 0$ would be considered insensitive, since, typically, the sensitive information is performing an action, not the opposite. As $y > 0$, while it induces an a-posteriori belief probability that differs from $f_X(x)$, Theorem 4.3 implies that all values of $x$ are “suspicious”, and that offers a significant shield of privacy. The next theorem spells out explicitly the a-posteriori belief probability.

**Theorem 4.4.** Let $I(y) := 1/\sum_{j=1}^A f_X(k)/k$ and $\psi(x) := \sum_{j=1}^A \psi(x)$ for every integer $1 \leq j \leq A$. Then, for every $x \in \{1, \ldots, A\}$, the following holds: if $y \leq A$,

$$\frac{f_X(x|Y = y)}{f_X(x)} = \begin{cases} \frac{\psi(x)}{y} & x \leq y \\ \frac{\psi(y)}{x} + \frac{\psi(y)(1-\mu)}{x} & x > y \end{cases}, \quad (9)$$

while if $y > A$ then

$$\frac{f_X(x|Y = y)}{f_X(x)} = \frac{\psi(x)}{Ax}. \quad (10)$$

Proof. By Equation (8), $\alpha(y, \mu) = \frac{1}{\psi(y/\mu)}$. We claim that this equality implies that

$$I := \int_{y/\mu}^\infty \psi(\mu) \cdot \frac{\Psi(x)}{y} d\mu = \frac{\Psi(x)}{y}. \quad (11)$$

Indeed, the interval of integration can be split into $x$ intervals: $I = \sum_{j=1}^x \int_{y/j}^{(y/j-1)} \frac{\mu^{-2} d\mu}{\psi(y/\mu)}$. Along the $j$’th integral of integration, $[y/\mu, j]$, whence $1/\alpha(y, \mu) = \psi(j)$ there. Therefore,

$$I = \sum_{j=1}^x \psi(j) \int_{y/j}^{(y/j-1)} \mu^{-2} d\mu = \sum_{j=1}^x \psi(j) \frac{\psi(y)}{y} = \frac{\Psi(x)}{y}.$$

The first case in Equation (9) follows from Equations (7) and (11), since in that case $\Phi(\mu) = \mu^{-2}$ and the lower limit of the integral in Equation (7) is $\max\{1, y/x\}$, $y/x$. The proof of Equation (10) is similar, where the only difference is that in that case (in which $y > A$), $\Phi(\mu) = \frac{y}{\mu} \mu^{-2}$, whence we get eventually $\frac{\psi(x)}{x} \Phi(\mu) = \frac{\psi(x)}{y}$.

It remains to prove the second case in Equation (9) where $x > y$ and, therefore, the lower limit of the integral in Equation (7) is $\max\{1, y/x\} = 1$. In that case, we split the interval of integration as follows: $[1, \infty) = [1, y/[y/x]] \cup [y/[y/x], \infty]$. 

564
By Equation (11), the integral over \([y/\lfloor y \rfloor, \infty)\) equals \(\Psi(\lfloor y \rfloor)\).
Hence, the result is\(\int_1^\infty \frac{\mu^{-2}d\mu}{\alpha(y, \mu)} = \Psi(\lfloor y \rfloor)\).

As for the interval \([1, y/\lfloor y \rfloor)\), along it we have \(\lfloor y/\mu \rfloor = \lfloor y \rfloor\).
Hence, the result is\(\int_1^{y/\lfloor y \rfloor} \frac{\mu^{-2}d\mu}{\alpha(y, \mu)} + \Psi(\lfloor y \rfloor)(1 - \lfloor y \rfloor/y)\).

That completes the proof of the second case in Equation (9).

Note that any value of \(y > A\) generates the very same a-posteriori belief probability (given in Equation (10)), regardless of the value of \(x\); that effect is a result of our selection of the probability distribution \(Z\) in Protocol 3.

In Section 7.2 we perform extensive experimentation that demonstrates the privacy preservation offered by Protocol 3.

5. SECURE PROTOCOLS FOR LINK INFLUENCE STRENGTH

The players \(H\) (the host) and \(P_1, \ldots, P_m\) (the service providers) wish to compute jointly influence probabilities \(p_{i,j}\) for all \((i, j) \in E\), as defined in Section 3.1. Their goal is to perform those computations while preserving their private information. The private information of \(P_k\), \(1 \leq k \leq m\), is his private log \(L_k\). The private information of \(H\) is the arc structure \(E\). As discussed in the Introduction, we consider two cases: (1) the exclusive case, where each action is supported exclusively by one of the players, and (2) the non-exclusive case, where each action can be supported by more than one player.

5.1 The exclusive case

We first consider the simpler definition (Equation (1)) and discuss later the definition in Equation (2). As defined in Section 3.1, \(a_i\) is the number of actions that user \(v_i\) performed, while \(b_{i,j}\) is the number of actions that \(v_j\) did following \(v_i\). For each \(1 \leq i \leq m\), let \(a_{i,k}\) denote the number of records in \(L_k\) that involve \(v_i\). Since we assumed that each user may perform any given action at most once, then \(a_i = \sum_{k=1}^m a_{i,k}\). (This equality holds in both the exclusive and non-exclusive cases.) Let \(b_{i,j}^{a_i}\) denote the number of actions \(a\) such that \(L_k\) includes a record \((v_i, a, t)\) as well as a record \((v_j, a, t')\), where \(t < t' \leq t + h\). Then in the exclusive case, where each action \(a\) can appear in only one of the logs, we have \(b_{i,j}^{a_i} = \sum_{k=1}^m b_{i,j,k}^{a_i}\).

Protocol 4, which involves the service providers and the host, enables the latter to compute the influence probabilities \(p_{i,j}\), for all arcs \((v_i, v_j) \in E\), according to the definition in Equation (1). First, \(H\) hides his edge set within a larger set of edges, \(E'\), which he sends to \(P_1, \ldots, P_m\) (Steps 1-2); the edges in \(E'\setminus E\) are selected uniformly at random from the set of all pairs \((v_i, v_j) \in E\), where \(v_i \neq v_j\).

Then, the service providers perform Protocol 2 for \(a_i\) and \(b_{i,j}^{a_i}\) for all pairs of nodes that appear in the augmented edge set \(E'\) (Steps 3-4). Note that Protocol 2 is designed to compute integer additive shares for a single sum. Here, we perform that protocol in parallel for \(n + |\Omega_{E'}|\) sums (all \(a_i\) and \(b_{i,j}^{a_i}\) counters). Several comments are in order regarding the implementation of Steps 3 and 4:

- Letting \(A = |A|\) be the total number of possible actions, then all counters are integers between 0 and \(A\); the value of \(S \gg A\) that is used in Protocol 2 is chosen jointly by the service providers.

 Protocol 4 - Secure computation of link influence probability.

**Input:** \(H\) owns the social graph, \(G = (V, E)\), where \(V = \{v_1, \ldots, v_n\}\). \(P_k\), \(1 \leq k \leq m\), owns an action log \(L_k\).

**Output:** \(H\) gets \(p_{i,j}\) for all \((i, j) \in E\).

1. \(H\) generates a set \(E' \subset V \times V\) such that \(|E'| \geq |E|\) for some given constant \(c > 1\).
2. \(H\) sends \(\Omega_{E'} := \{(i, j) : (v_i, v_j) \in E'\}\) to \(P_k\), \(1 \leq k \leq m\).
3. \(P_1, \ldots, P_m\) perform Protocol 2 in parallel for \(a_i = \sum_{k=1}^m a_{i,k}\), for all \(1 \leq i \leq n\). At the end of that protocol, \(P_1\) has \(s_{1}^{a_i}\) and \(P_2\) has \(s_{2}^{a_i}\) such that \(s_{1}^{a_i} + s_{2}^{a_i} = a_i\).
4. \(P_1, \ldots, P_m\) perform Protocol 2 in parallel for \(b_{i,j}^{a_i} = \sum_{k=1}^m b_{i,j,k}^{a_i}\), for all \((i, j) \in \Omega_{E'}\).
5. For each \(1 \leq i \leq n\), \(P_1\) and \(P_2\) jointly generate independent random real numbers \(M_i \sim Z\), where \(Z\) is as in Protocol 3.
6. For each \(1 \leq i \leq n\), \(P_1\) and \(P_2\) jointly generate independent random real numbers \(r_i \sim U(0, M_i)\).
7. \(P_1\) sends \(r_i s_{1}^{a_i}\) for all \(1 \leq i \leq n\) and \(r_i s_{2}^{a_i}\) for all \((i, j) \in \Omega_{E'}\) to \(H\).
8. \(P_2\) sends \(r_i s_{2}^{a_i}\) for all \(1 \leq i \leq n\) and \(r_i s_{2}^{a_i}\) for all \((i, j) \in \Omega_{E'}\) to \(H\).
9. For each \((i, j)\) such that \((v_i, v_j) \in E\), \(H\) computes \(p_{i,j} = (r_i s_{1}^{a_i} + r_i s_{2}^{a_i})/(r_i s_{1}^{a_i} + r_i s_{2}^{a_i})\) (where the quotient is set to zero if the denominator is).

- Steps 3 and 4 appear in Protocol 4 as two separated steps just for the sake of clarity; in implementing the protocol we propose to handle all \(n + |\Omega_{E'}|\) counters in parallel.

- In Steps 3-4 of the parallelized Protocol 2, \(P_1\) and \(P_2\) send to \(P_3\) the values \(s_1\) and \(s_2 + r\) that correspond to each of the \(n + |\Omega_{E'}|\) counters. In doing so, \(P_1\) and \(P_2\) chose a random permutation of the \(n + |\Omega_{E'}|\) counters which they keep secret from \(P_3\); then, \(P_1\) uses that permutation to permute the sequence of \(s_1 + |\Omega_{E'}|\) values of \(s_1\) that he sends to \(P_3\), and \(P_2\) does the same for his sequence of \(s_2 + r\) values. This way, even though some of the \(s_1, s_2 + r\) pairs may be used by \(P_1\) to infer lower or upper bounds on the corresponding counters (as shown in Theorem 4.1), he will not be able to tell which of the counters those pairs correspond to. Hence, by using such a secret permutation, the potential information leakage to \(P_1\) becomes useless.

At this stage, \(P_1\) and \(P_2\) hold random additive shares in \(a_i\) (the number of actions that \(v_i\) performed in total) and \(b_{i,j}^{a_i}\) (the number of times where \(v_j\) followed \(v_i\) for all users \(1 \leq i \leq n\) and all edges in \(E'\)). They now wish to let \(H\) compute the quotient \(b_{i,j}^{a_i}/a_i\), being a measure of the influence that \(v_i\) has on \(v_j\), without leaking to him information on \(a_i\) and \(b_{i,j}^{a_i}\) beyond what is implied by the quotient. To that end, \(P_1, P_2\) and \(H\) engage in a variant of Protocol 3, where the multipliers \(r_i\) are chosen independently for each user \(v_i\) (Steps 5-9). (It is a variant of Protocol 3 since here the masking random value \(r_i\) multipiles the shares of the numerator \(b_{i,j}^{a_i}\) and the denominator \(a_i\), rather than directly \(b_{i,j}^{a_i}\) and \(a_i\).)

It is clear that Protocol 4 is correct and complete in the sense that it ends with \(H\) having \(p_{i,j} = b_{i,j}^{a_i}/a_i\) for all arcs in
E. (Indeed, \((r_i s_{i,j}^2 + r_i s_{i,j}^2)/(r_i s_{i,j}^2 + r_i s_{i,j}^2) = (s_{i,j}^2 + s_{i,j}^2)/(s_{i,j}^2 + s_{i,j}^2) = b_{i,j}/a_{i,j}\) 

A protocol for computing the link privacyby Equation (2) goes along the same lines, since also in that definition the numerator is a sum of private values which each \(P_k\) has, \(1 \leq k \leq m\). Hence, the only modification in Protocol 4 is in Step 4, where the players invoke Protocol 2 to compute additive shares in \(\sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i c_{i,j}\); all other steps remain the same.

5.1.1 The privacy offered by Protocol 4 

First, we discuss the privacy that the protocol provides for the host \(H\); then, we discuss the privacy that it provides for the service providers \(P_1, \ldots, P_m\).

\(H\) aims at protecting the arc structure. Protocol 4 does not provide full protection for that information since \(P_1, \ldots, P_m\) know that \(E\) is a subset of \(E'\). The structure could be fully protected by selecting \(E'\) to be the set of all pairs of nodes. However, such a selection will impose large computation and communication costs. In general, by suitably selecting the multiplying factor \(c\), one can directly handle the privacy-efficiency trade-off. Another way to achieve a perfect hiding of \(E\) is by resorting to oblivious transfer protocols. Specifically, the players could perform Steps 3-4 in Protocol 4 for all \(n^2 - n\) pairs \(1 \leq i \neq j \leq n\). Then, \(H\) could execute a \(|E|\)-out-of-\((n^2 - n)\) oblivious transfer protocol (e.g. [30]) vis-a-vis \(P_i\) to retrieve, obliviously, the values of \(s_{i,j}^2\) for all \((i, j)\) such that \((v_i, v_j) \in E\), and similarly with \(P_k\) for \(s_{i,j}^3\). Alas, such a solution, albeit more secure, is extremely prohibitive since it entails \(O(|E|n^2)\) modular exponentiations, and, in addition, it requires \(P_1, \ldots, P_m\) to perform Protocol 2 for all \(n^2 - n\) pairs \((i, j)\), \(1 \leq i \neq j \leq n\).

\(P_k\), \(1 \leq k \leq m\), wish to protect their private inputs \(a_{i,k}\) and \(b_{i,j,k}\), as well as the aggregate counters \(a_i\) and \(b_{i,j}\). During Protocol 4, \(P_1, \ldots, P_m\) execute independent runs of Protocol 2 for each of those counters (Steps 3-4). Namely, the random shares that are generated by the players in each run of Protocol 2 are independent; consequently, views from different runs cannot be combined to infer more information than what could be extracted from the separate views. The analysis in Section 4.1 shows that none of those players learns any information on the private counters of his peers or on the aggregate counters, apart from \(P_2\) and \(P_3\) who may infer a lower or an upper bound on some (very few) of the aggregate counters. However, the probability of the latter event can be made as small as desired by increasing \(S\). Specifically, if we wish to restrict the probability of either \(P_2\) or \(P_3\) learning any information on any of the \(n + |\Omega_{|E'|}|\) aggregate counters to be no larger than \(\varepsilon\), it is implied by Theorem 4.1 that all we need to do is to select \(S \geq A \cdot (1 + 2(n + |\Omega_{|E'|}|)/\varepsilon)\).

Finally, we consider the possibility that \(H\) can extract on any of the counters \(c \in (a_{i,k})_{1 \leq i \leq n} \cup (b_{i,j,k})_{1 \leq i,j \leq k} < |E'|\). For each such \(c\), \(H\) obtains the course in Protocol 4 a single value of the form \(rc\) for some random real number \(r\). The analysis in Section 4.2 shows that \(H\) can only obtain a-posteriori belief probabilities regarding those counters which may differ from the corresponding priors. As those posteriors are spread quite evenly on the entire range of possible positive values of those counters, the utilized mechanism effectively protects that information also from \(H\).

We note that if \(H\) has a prior belief about a relation between, say, \(a_1\) and \(a_2\) (e.g., that \(a_1 = a_2\) for some \(a\)) he will get two a-posteriori belief probabilities for those counters. We omit a discussion of such models due to page limitation.

5.2 The non-exclusive case 

So far we dealt with a distributed setting in which the service providers had exclusivity over the actions. Namely, each action \(\alpha \in A\) was supported by exactly one of the service providers \(P_k\), \(1 \leq k \leq m\). Such an exclusivity assumption does not always hold. For example, an action could be buying the book "Fifty Shades of Grey"; if \(P_1, \ldots, P_m\) are all bookstores, then records with that action may appear in each of the action logs \(L_1, \ldots, L_m\). In such a non-exclusive setting, a preprocessing stage has to be done before the solution that we described above can be executed.

Assume that the set of all possible actions, \(A\), is partitioned into disjoint classes, \(A = \bigcup_{q=1}^{Q} A_q\), where each \(A_q\) is a class of a different type of actions: buying books, seeing movies, signing petitions, joining social groups, voting, etc. For each class of actions \(A_q\), there exists a subset of service providers \(P_q \subseteq \{P_1, \ldots, P_m\}\) that support actions from \(A_q\). The meaning of that is that any action \(\alpha \in A_q\) may appear only in action logs of players from \(P_q\). However, the action logs of players from \(P_q\) may contain also actions not in \(A_q\); namely, the subsets \(P_q, 1 \leq q \leq Q\), are not necessarily disjoint. The classes \(A_q\) and the corresponding groups \(P_q, 1 \leq q \leq Q\), are known to all. In Protocol 5 we describe the preprocessing procedure for one of the action classes; it has to be performed for each of the \(Q\) classes. After executing that protocol for \(\alpha\), say, action class \(A_1\), one of the players in \(P_1\) gets the corresponding aggregated counters, \(a_{i,[A_1]}\) (the total number of actions from \(A_1\) that were performed by user \(v_i\) through any of the service providers in \(P_1\)) and \(b_{i,j,[A_1]}\) (the total number of \(A_1\)-actions in which \(v_i\) followed \(v_j\), assuming a memory window of width \(h\)), \(1 \leq i \neq j \leq n\). From that point on, all players in \(P_1\) remove from their action logs all records that correspond to \(A_1\)-actions, since all of those actions are already recorded in the counters \(a_{i,[A_1]}\) and \(b_{i,j,[A_1]}\) that the representative player holds. After performing Protocol 5 for all \(1 \leq q \leq Q\), the players may proceed to apply Protocol 4 that was described in Section 5.1 for the exclusive setting.

Without loss of generality, we assume in Protocol 5 that the class action is \(A_1\) and that \(P_1 = \{P_1, \ldots, P_m\}\). In performing this procedure, the players in \(P_1\) are assisted by a trusted third party \(\hat{P}\) whom they select from among the other players, \(\{H, P_2, \ldots, P_m\}\). They also select one of them, say \(P_1\), as the player that receives at the end of the protocol the aggregated counters for all \(A_1\)-actions and uses them, on behalf of all of them, in Protocol 4.

Protocol 5 is described as a protocol template. In Step 1, each player in \(P_1\) constructs \(\mathbb{L}_k, A_{\hat{j}}\), as the subset of \(\mathbb{L}_k\) that consists of all \(A_1\)-actions, and then removes that subset from \(\mathbb{L}_k\). Each player in \(P_1\) then transforms the proprietary \(A_1\)-action log, \(\mathbb{L}_k, A_{\hat{j}}\), into an obfuscated form, denoted \(\mathbb{L}_k, A_{\hat{k}}\), and sends it to the trusted third party \(\hat{P}\) (Step 2). \(\hat{P}\) unifies all obfuscated logs, and computes the relevant counters (Steps 3-4). Finally, \(\hat{P}\) sends those counters to \(P_1\) who recovers the correct counter values from them (Steps 5-6). Next, we discuss possible methods for obfuscating the log entries (Step 2).

A basic method for obfuscating the action log. The first method hides the user identities and action identifiers, but retains the time entries. Specifically, the players in \(P_1\)
Protocol 5 - Secure computation of the aggregated counters for a class action

Input: Player $P_k$, $1 \leq k \leq d$, has an action log $L_{bk}$.

Output: $P_i$ gets the counters $a_i[A_t]$ and $b^i_{i,j}[A_t]$ for all $1 \leq i \neq j \leq n$.

1: Each $P_k$, $1 \leq k \leq d$, defines $L_{bk,A_t} = \{(v_i, \alpha, t) \in L_b : \alpha \in A_t\}$ and then sets $L_b \leftarrow L_{bk,A_t}$.
2: Each $P_k$, $1 \leq k \leq d$, transforms $L_{b,A_t}$ to $L_{b,A_t}$ and then sends it to $P_t$.
3: $P_t$ computes $L_{b,A_t} = \bigcup_{k=1}^d L_{bk,A_t}$.
4: $P_t$ computes from $L_{b,A_t}$ the relevant counters.
5: $P_t$ sends the nonzero counters to $P_i$.
6: $P_i$ recovers from the retrieved counters the correct ones $a_i[A_t]$ and $b^i_{i,j}[A_t]$.

agree on secret identifying numbers for the actions in $A_1$ and new user identifiers which are kept secret from $P$. For example, they could jointly create secret permutations $\pi$ on $\{1, \ldots, n\}$ and new user identifiers $\alpha$ on $A_1$, and then transform each record of the form $(v_i, \alpha, t)$ to $(v_{\pi(i)}, \sigma(\alpha), t)$. Since the time entry remains unchanged, $P$ can compute all necessary counters for the permuted user identifiers and then $P_i$ can recover from them the counters for the original user identifiers.

Without any background knowledge about user activity, the only information that $P$ can deduce is that some user $v_i$ did some action at a given time $t$, but since $\pi$ and $\sigma$ are selected uniformly at random, all users and all actions would be equally likely. If, on the other hand, $P$ knows that a specific user $v_i$ is significantly more active than other users, it may be possible to identify, with some probability, the permuted identifier that corresponds to $v_i$ and then observe $v_i$’s activity pattern in time. For example, if $P$ can identify with certainty the permuted identifier of such a target user $v_j$, then $P$ may deduce the number of $A_1$-actions that $v_j$ performed in each time stamp, but not which actions.

We note that $P_i$ may learn information on activity of users at other sites. For example, if user $v_i$ performed $a_i[A_t]$ actions of class $A_1$ at $P_i$, then he must have performed $a_i[A_t] - a_{i,i}A_t$ actions of that class at sites $P_1 \ldots P_i$; however, as $P_i$ returns to $P_i$ aggregated counters (and not counters per action), $P_i$ is unable to reveal what actions from that class took place in those sites.

An enhanced method for obfuscating the action log.

In order to obfuscate also the time information, we propose the following enhancement of the method above. Assume that the time frame is $[0, T + h]$. The $P_i$-players select a random key $s \in Z_2^* := \{0, 1, \ldots, T+h-1\}$ and then encrypt all time stamps using the shift cipher, $t \mapsto e_s(t) := t + s \mod S$. Hence, any record $(v_i, \alpha, t) \in L_{b,A_t}$, $1 \leq k \leq d$, is transformed to $(v_{\pi(i)}, \sigma(\alpha), e_s(t))$. The trusted party $P_t$ can still compute all counters $a_i[A_t]$ and $b^i_{i,j}[A_t]$, for the permuted user identifiers, by considering the record $(v_{\pi(i)}, \sigma(\alpha), e_s(t))$ as a follower of $(v_{\pi(i)}, \sigma(\alpha), e_s(t'))$ if $e_s(t') \in \{e_s(t) + \tau \mod S : 1 \leq \tau \leq h\}$.

Indeed, since there are no original records $(v_i, \alpha, t)$ with $T \leq t < T+h$, condition (12) holds if and only if $t < t' \leq t+h$.

As, such an encryption of the time information does not stand on its own since $P$ can easily detect the sequence of $h$ encrypted time stamps $e_s(T), \ldots, e_s(T+h-1)$ in which there is no activity and, consequently, invent the encryption and recover the original time stamps. Hence, it is necessary to add also fake activity to time stamps $T, \ldots, T+h-1$ in order to prevent this inference of the original time stamps. One way of doing that is by adding fake users and use them to create fake activity that will disable $P$ from inferring the true time stamps. Since such fake entries in the obfuscated logs may affect only counters $a_i[A_t]$ in which $i$ corresponds to a fake user and counters $b^i_{i,j}[A_t]$ in which at least one of $i, j$ corresponds to a fake user, $P_i$ can simply ignore those irrelevant counters.

To that end, the users decide on a number $n'$ of fake users and then hide the true users by selecting a random injection $f : \{1, \ldots, n\} \rightarrow \{1, \ldots, n+n'\}$. Then, each player augments his $A_1$-action log $L_{b,k,A_t}$ by fake records of the form $(v_i, \alpha, t)$ where $v_i$ is a fake user. Assume that for $P_k$, $1 \leq k \leq d$, the number of actions in $L_{b,k,A_t}$ with the time stamp $t = w_k(t)$, and let $W_k$ be $\max_{0 \leq t \leq T-h} w_k(t)$. Then for all $0 \leq t \leq T-h$, $P_k$ adds to $L_{b,k,A_t}$ records of the form $(v_i, \alpha, t)$, where $v_i$ is one of the fake users, so that the resulting number of actions in $L_{b,k,A_t}$ with time stamp $t = w_k(t)$ is $W_k$. If all players do so, the trusted third party $P_t$ will not be able to distinguish $e_s(T), \ldots, e_s(T+h-1)$ from $e_s(0), \ldots, e_s(T-1)$ since in each of those encrypted time stamps there will be the same number of actions. Consequently, given an encrypted time stamp $e_s(t)$, all values of $0 \leq t \leq T-h + 1$ will be equally likely for $P_t$.

6 Secure protocols for computing the user influence scores

Here we discuss the secure computation of user influence scores according to Definition 3.3.

6.1 The exclusive case

Protocol 6, which we explain below, enables $H$ to compute the propagation graphs $PG(\alpha)$ for all $\alpha \in A$, with the collaboration of $P_1, \ldots, P_m$. After having obtained all these labeled graphs, $H$ can proceed on his own to compute $Ins_c(v_i, \alpha)$ for every desired setting of $\tau$, and for all $v_i \in V$ and $\alpha \in A$. As a result, $H$ will be able to compute the numerator in Equation (3). In order to complete the computation of the user influence scores, $H$ needs also to know the denominator $\Delta_{\alpha,i,j}$ in Equation (3), for all $v_i \in V$. That computation is already covered by Protocol 4.

In Protocol 4, the arc structure $E'$ is obfuscated by hiding it within a larger arc set $E'$ (Steps 1-2). In addition, $H$ selects keys in a public key cryptosystem and sends the public key to $P_1, \ldots, P_m$ (Step 3). Then, each player computes for each action that it supports a corresponding set of time difference values, $\Delta_{\alpha,i,j}$, for all $(i,j) \in G_E$. The time difference $\Delta_{\alpha,i,j}$ equals $t_j - t_i$ in case $E_{\alpha,i,j} \in G_E$ contains records $(v_i, \tau(t_i), t_i)$ and $(v_j, \alpha, t_j)$ and $t_i < t_j$; in all other cases $\Delta_{\alpha,i,j} = 0$. After computing $\Delta_{\alpha,i,j}$, which consists of $\Delta_{\alpha,i,j}$ for all $(i,j) \in G_E$ (ordered first by $i$ and then by $j$), $P_i$ encrypts that information using the public key $e$ of $H$ and sends it to $P_t$ (Steps 4-9). $P_t$ accumulates all those encrypted messages from his peers and sends them to $H$ (Step 10). Finally, $H$ decrypts those messages (Step 11) and uses them to construct the arc
set \( E(\alpha) \) in \( PG(\alpha) \) for all \( \alpha \in A \) (Step 12); \( E(\alpha) \) consists of all arcs \((v_i, v_j) \in E \) for which \( \Delta_{\alpha,i,j} > 0 \) (those are the arc labels).

**Protocol 6** - Secure computation of the propagation graphs \( PG(\alpha) \) for all \( \alpha \in A \)

**Input:** \( H \) has the social graph, \( G = (V,E) \), where \( V = \{v_1, \ldots, v_n\} \). \( P_k, 1 \leq k \leq m \), has an action log \( L_k \).

**Output:** \( H \) gets \( PG(\alpha) \) for all \( \alpha \in A \).

1. \( H \) generates uniformly at random a set \( E' \subset V \times V \) such that \( E' \supset E \) and \( |E'| \geq c|E| \) for some given constant \( c > 1 \).
2. \( H \) sends \( \Omega_{E'} := \{(i,j) : (v_i,v_j) \in E'\} \) to \( P_k, 1 \leq k \leq m. \)
3. \( H \) selects a pair of private and public keys in a public key cryptosystem and sends the public key, \( \kappa \), to \( P_k, 1 \leq k \leq m. \)
4. for all \( 1 \leq k \leq m \) do
5. for all actions \( \alpha \in A \) that are controlled by \( P_k \) do
6. \( P_k \) computes \( \Delta_{\alpha} := \{\Delta_{\alpha,i,j} \leq (i,j) \in \Omega_{E'}\}. \)
7. \( P_k \) sends \( M_\alpha := E_\alpha(\Delta_{\alpha}) \) to \( P_1. \)
8. end for
9. end for
10. \( P_1 \) sends \( \{M_\alpha : \alpha \in A\} \) to \( H. \)
11. \( H \) decrypts \( M_\alpha \) and recovers \( \Delta_{\alpha} \) for all \( \alpha \in A \).
12. \( H \) recovers the arc set \( E(\alpha) \) and the corresponding arc labels.

We turn our attention to the security of this protocol. As discussed in Section 5.1, the private information of \( P \) and communication costs, by increasing \( c \) (who does not possess the decryption key) can learn no information on \( H \). In addition, since each \( \Delta_{\alpha} \) with any of the service providers. In order to evaluate the performance of our two main distributed protocols, we analyze their communication costs:

- **NR:** Number of communication rounds. (A communication round is a stage in the protocol in which some or all of the players send messages to other players, and the protocol can proceed only after all messages are received by their recipients.)
- **NM:** The total number of messages sent (from any player to any other player).
- **MS:** The total size in bits of all \( NM \) messages.

### 7.1 Communication costs

**Protocol 4**

The communication costs of Protocol 4 are analyzed in Table 1. (Here \( q := |E'| \) and \( f \) is the size in bits for representing real numbers.) Each row in the table corresponds to one communication round. The first column indicates the corresponding step in the protocol description; the second column gives the number of messages that are sent in that round; and the third column gives the size in bits of each message.

As appears from Table 1, Protocol 4 entails \( NR = 8 \) communication rounds. The total number of messages sent is \( NM = m^2 + m + 7 \). As for message sizes, the longest messages occur in rounds 2,3,4 (assuming that \( S \) is chosen to be a very large integer for enhancing privacy). Since the total number of messages in those three rounds is \( m^2 \), we get that \( MS = O(m^2(n+q) \log S) \). Recall that \( q = c|E| \), where \( c > 1 \). Hence, Protocol 4 involves sending roughly \( cm^2 \log S \) bits of communication messages for each link.
7.1.2 Protocol 6

The communication costs of Protocol 6 are analyzed in Table 2. Here, |κ| and z are, respectively, the size of the public key and ciphertext in the cryptosystem that H chose, and A_k is the number of actions that are controlled by P_k, 1 ≤ k ≤ m. (We focus here on the exclusive case, whence A = ∑_{k=1}^{m} A_k.) The first two rounds correspond to Steps 2 and 3 in the protocol. In the third round, player P_k, 2 ≤ k ≤ m, sends to P_1 the encrypted message E_n(Δ_k) for each of the A_k actions that P_k controls. Hence, we have in this round m − 1 parallel messages, where the kth message consists of A_k sub-messages, each of which contains q encryptions of an integer. Hence, the size in bits of the kth message is qzA_k. The last round corresponds to Step 10 in which P_1 sends to H the aggregation of all encrypted messages.

As appears from the table, Protocol 6 entails NR = 4 communication rounds. The total number of messages sent is NM = 3m. The overall message size in bits is dominated by the message size in the last two rounds, which equals qz(A + ∑_{k=2}^{m} A_k) ≤ 2qzA. Hence, Protocol 6 involves sending 2zA bits of communication messages for each link. The recommended setting of z, when using the RSA cryptosystem, is 1024; when using an elliptic curve cryptosystem, a corresponding privacy setting:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communication round</th>
<th>Num. messages</th>
<th>Message size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 2</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steps 3-4; Prot. 1, Step 2</td>
<td>m(m − 1)</td>
<td>(n + q)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steps 3-4; Prot. 1, Step 4</td>
<td>m − 2</td>
<td>(n + q)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steps 3-4; Prot. 2, Steps 3-4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(n + q)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steps 3-4; Prot. 2, Step 6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n + q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>n f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>n f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steps 7-8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(n + q)f</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Communication costs of Protocol 6

7.2 Privacy offered by the secure division protocol

Here we conduct experimentation that examines the privacy preservation offered by Protocol 3. Let us recall the corresponding privacy setting: X is a discrete random variable that takes values in a domain of integers {0, 1, . . . , A}; in our application, X stands for the number of actions for some user performed, a_i, or the number of actions in which one user influenced another, b_{i,j}. The curious-but-honest party H has an a-priori belief probability f_X(·) regarding the value of X. In Protocol 3, H learns the variable y := rx, where r is the value that X took and r is a random variable that is chosen in Steps 1-2 of the protocol. That value of y enables H to extract an a-posteriori belief probability, f_X(Y = y), regarding the value of x, as characterized in Theorem 4.4. Our goal here is to check whether the a-posteriori belief probability f_X(Y = y) allows H to guess x better than the a-priori belief probability f_X(·) does. To that end, we perform the following experiment:

1. Select an a-priori belief probability f_X(·) on {0, 1, . . . , A}, and then compute f_X := ∑_{i=0}^{A} f_X(i).

(In all experiments we used A = 10.)

2. Fix x ∈ {1, . . . , A}.

3. Compute E_{pre} := |x − f_X|.

4. For j = 1, . . . , 1000 do:
   (a) Generate r and compute y = rx.
   (b) Compute f_X(Y = y) and f_X(Y = y) := ∑_{i=0}^{A} f_X(i) × |Y = y|.
   (c) Compute E_{pos} := |x − f_X(Y = y)|.
   (d) Set G_j := E_{pre} − E_{pos}.

Here, E_{pre} is the error if H tries to guess that x equals the mean of the a-priori belief probability f_X(·). E_{pos}, on the other hand, is the error if H tries to guess that x equals the mean of the a-posteriori belief probability f_X(Y = y).

The difference G_j is the gain that H obtains, regarding the value of x, as a result of seeing y = rx. Positive values of G_j indicate that the value of y in the jth trial helped H to make a better guess about x; negative values of G_j indicate the opposite.

We repeated this experiment with several prior belief probabilities over x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , A}. Due to space limitations, we report here the results with two priors: (a) A uniform prior, f_X(i) = 1/(A + 1), for all 0 ≤ i ≤ A. (b) A unimodal distribution that has one maximum at i = A/2: f_X(i) = (i + 1)/(1 + A/2)^2 for all 0 ≤ i ≤ A/2 and f_X(i) = (A + 1 − i)/(1 + A/2)^2 for all A/2 < i ≤ A. In each experiment we computed 10004 gain values, {G_j(i) : 1 ≤ j ≤ 1000}, where G_j(i) indicates the gain in the jth trial when the initial value of x was set to x = i. Figure 1 shows histograms that describe the distribution of the resulting gains. In each of those histograms, the height of the bar over an interval [a, b) equals the number of gains G_j(i) that satisfy a ≤ G_j(i) < b. Each histogram also shows the average gain over all 10004 trials. As can be seen, the average gain is positive and very small: the number of trials in which y does help to come up with a better guess for x is larger than the number of trials in which y yields worse guesses, but there is no significant bias towards the first case, and, in addition, the improvement in the quality of the guess is small. To summarize: from information theoretical point of view, y does reveal some information on x; but from a practical point of view the gain of information is insignificant.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

Viral marketing is a popular concept in the marketing literature which is receiving a growing attention for the great potentiality, and the challenging computational problems associated. Motivated by the real-world needs and constraints, in this paper we study the problems of how different parties can learn, in a privacy-preserving way, (1) the strength of influence along each link of a social network, and (2) an influence score for each node. These are fundamental computational problems at the basis of viral marketing. We devise secure multiparty computation protocols for these two problems and analyze their privacy guarantees.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to discuss privacy issues of viral marketing and to propose protocols. This paper represents only a first step in this interesting and challenging domain. Future research directions include a solution of other computational problems in the setting that we discussed herein (like computing the nodes which maximize the expected spread [1]), or by considering more elaborated settings. One such setting is that in which all or some of the users are labeled by attributes (e.g., gender, location, occupation) that could be used, in conjunction with the activity logs, to better estimate the influence strengths of the links. Another setting is that of multiple hosts, where the graph data is split between several social networking platforms.

Acknowledgments. This work was supported by MULTISENSOR project, partially funded by the European Commission, under the contract number FP7-610411.

9. REFERENCES